OPTIMAL CROP INSURANCE OPTIONS FOR ALABAMA COTTON-PEANUT PRODUCERS: A TARGET-MOTAD ANALYSIS by Irimia-Vladu, Marina et al.
 
Optimal Crop Insurance Options for Alabama Cotton-Peanut Producers:  





Graduate Research Assistant 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology 






Dr. James L. Novak 
Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology 





Dr. Patricia Duffy 
Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology 














Selected paper prepared for presentation at the Southern Agricultural Economics 
Association Annual Meeting, Tulsa, Oklahoma, February 14-18, 2004. 
 
Copyright 2004 by authors. All rights reserved. Readers may not make copies of all or 
part of this paper without first obtaining permission from one of the above-listed authors. OPTIMAL CROP INSURANCE OPTIONS FOR ALABAMA COTTON-PEANUT 
PRODUCERS: A TARGET-MOTAD ANALYSIS 
Abstract 
Target-MOTAD was used to determine the optimal crop insurance options for two 
representative cotton and peanut farms in southern Alabama. Results showed that, for one of the 
farms, no crop insurance option was risk reducing given the yield history. For the other farm, 
risk reduction involved shifting to higher levels of insurance coverage.  
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Introduction 
Reducing price and yield risks is especially important for producers of high-value crops 
such as cotton and peanuts.  Because per acre variable costs of production for cotton and peanuts 
can be several times those incurred in the production of corn or small grains, protection of the 
"sunk cost" investment is exceptionally important.  Through time, to protect against price and 
yield related losses producers have used various tools, including crop insurance, the futures 
market, forward contracting, and reliance on federal disaster programs. 
Currently, federal crop insurance is a primary means to protect against losses from poor 
harvests.  The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal risk-reducing crop insurance 
options for representative south Alabama cotton and peanut producers.  Although the number 
and variety of crop insurance programs has expanded in the past few years, two types of 
insurance products are currently being used in southern Alabama.  This analysis considers only 
these two products, Multi Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC).   
Crop Insurance History 






 other initiatives to help agriculture recover form the effects of the Great Depression and Dust 
Bowl. In 1938 the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) was created to administer an 
experimental program. Crop insurance activities were restricted to major crops in the main 
producing areas. Crop insurance remained as an experiment until the passage of the Federal Crop 
Insurance Act of 1980.   The Federal Crop Insurance Act extended the crop insurance program to 
many more crops and regions of the country. A subsidy equal to 30% of the crop insurance 
premium limited to the dollar amount at 65% coverage was authorized to encourage participation 
in the new crop insurance program. 
The program did not achieve Congress's expectations despite the increase in the number 
of farmers participating in the program. Ad hoc disaster bills were passed in 1988, 1989,1992 
and 1993 because of severe weather conditions (drought or wet and cool growing season). 
Because these ad hoc disaster bills were competing with the crop insurance program was 
strengthened with the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994. 
Under the 1994 Act, participation in the crop insurance program became mandatory for 
farmers to be eligible for deficiency payments under price support programs, certain loans, and 
other benefits. Also the catastrophic (CAT) coverage with completely subsidized premium was 
created. Under CAT coverage farmers were compensated at 60% of the price established for the 
crop for that year if the loss exceeded 50% of an average yield.  Participants paid $50 per crop 
per county subject to maximum amounts for multiple crops and counties insured by the same 
individual. Subsidies for higher coverage levels were increased. 
The mandatory participation requirement was abandoned by the Congress in 1996. 
However, farmers who accepted other benefits were required to purchase crop insurance or their 






 In 1996, the Risk Management Agency (RMA) was created to manage FCIC programs. 
In 2000, Congress passed legislation that expanded the role of the private sector. 
Premium subsides were increased to encourage producers to purchase higher insurance coverage 
levels and to make the insurance program more attractive to prospective producers.  FCIC has 
the mission to stimulate the sale of crop insurance and to provide reinsurance (subsidy) to 
approved commercial insurers, which insure agricultural commodities using FCIC-approved 
acceptable plans. 
Provisions of Current Policy 
The relationship between the public and private sector is as follows: The insured farmer 
has a contract with the commercial insurance provider.  Premium rates as well as insurance terms 
and conditions are established by the FCIC for the products it developed, or approved by FCIC 
through reinsurance agreement for products developed by private insurance providers.  
Crop insurance coverage levels are based upon Actual Production History (APH a 
producer’s actual yield history) or a percentage of an established county yield or a combination 
of both.  MPCI protects against losses to crop yield only.  MPCI makes indemnity payments 
when an insurable unit of a farm’s actual yield is below a yield guarantee.  Market Price 
elections are used to calculate dollar coverage levels and are based on expected market prices.  In 
general, insurance yield coverage levels range from 50 to 85% of APH in five percent increment.  
Price elections used in this analysis are the 2002 100% price elections of $0.52 per pound for 
cotton and $0.1775 per pound for peanuts.  Buy-up coverage levels guarantees up to 75% of the 
APH yield for peanuts and 85% for cotton.  Variation in price election level from $.52 and 
$.01775 is allowed but farmer’s seldom elect less than 100% price coverage.  Therefore a 100% 






 CRC protects against revenue loss from both yield loss and/or price fluctuation. CRC 
increases the revenue guarantee if the national harvest price is higher than the “base price” used 
to establish coverage prior to planting.  CRC is not available for peanuts, but is available for 
cotton.  A base insurance price of $.43 per pound was established for cotton in the 2002 
insurance contract.   However, a historic national harvest price of $.48 per pound, exceeding the 
base price, was achieved in 2002.   
Insurance premiums paid for the crops depend on the level of insurance chosen by the 
producer and the risk history of an individual producer’s situation.  Depending on the risk 
protection level chosen, producers pay only a portion of the risk-based premium plus a $30 
administrative fee (in 2002) per crop.  The U.S. government, through the Federal Crop Insurance 
Corporation pays the balance of the premium, including administrative overhead and a basic 
level of protection. 
Previous Research 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are believed to pose significant problems for the 
current crop insurance program.  Adverse selection arises because farmers with high relative 
yield-risk can buy insurance at the same cost as farmers who have lower relative yield-risk 
(Skees and Reed). Moral hazard occurs when producers, after purchasing insurance, alter their 
production or harvest practices to increase the chance of collecting crop insurance. To combat 
moral hazard, federal crop insurance requires a deductible of at least 25% of the producer’s 
normal yield.  
In 1949, Halcrow proposed a crop insurance program based on area yields rather then 
expected farm yields. Under an area-yield plan, the participant would receive an indemnity equal 






 producers from a given area would have the same indemnity per acre insured and would pay the 
same premium rate, regardless of their own crop yield.  Halcrow believed that individual crop 
insurance would not work in a satisfactory way because of adverse selection. 
Other analyses have evaluated the effectiveness of area-yield plan. Miranda analyzed 
Halcrow’s alternative using farm-level data from 102 western Kentucky soybean farms. He 
concluded that an area-yield design would be capable of providing effective yield-loss coverage. 
Carriker et al. (1990) compared the effectiveness of reducing yield and income variation 
for individual farm-yield and area-yield insurance. They conclude that individual farm-level 
insurance provides more farm income risk reducing, although it is complex and suffers from 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Using primary yield data and second-degree stochastic dominance analysis, Carriker et 
al. (1991) examined the effectiveness of several crop insurance and disaster assistance designs 
for reducing income and yield risk.  Results showed that risk-averse wheat producers and corn 
producers would prefer an actuarially fair individual-farm-yield insurance program with a 100% 
coverage level over either an area-insurance plan with 100% coverage or the free disaster 
assistance design with 65% coverage.  Williams et al. (1993) also found that individual crop 
insurance is preferred to area crop insurance and a subsidy is required for area crop insurance to 
be preferred to individual crop insurance.   In another study, Mahul (1999) found that the optimal 
area-yield crop insurance contract depends on the individual beta coefficient, which measures the 
sensitivity of farm yield to area yield.  Goodwin (2002) found that there is a correlation between 
a farm’s historical yield on other crops and a newly produced crop and stated that in such cases 







 Data and Methods 
Yields from two farms in Covington County Alabama were used in this study.  Tables 1 
and 2 provide this yield information.  Farm-level yield was used in this study because regional 
yields, which are averages, typically will show less variability than farm-level yields and thus 
would underestimate risk.  The net returns above variable cost were determined for each farm 
using these farm-level historical yields to represent expected yield outcomes. Published area 
prices were used for expected price outcomes as farm-level prices were not available. Operating 
expenses from cotton and peanut enterprise budgets of the Alabama Cooperative Extension 
System were used because no suitable farm-level cost data was available for these crops.   
Crop insurance premiums for 2002, corresponding to each farm and level of insurance, 
were determined using the Risk Management Agency/USDA crop insurance premium estimator 
(www.rma.usda.gov).  Net returns were estimated for different coverage levels of MPCI and 
CRC insurance for both peanuts and cotton.  The $.43 base price for cotton was used.  Market 
price for cotton reflected historic price for 1991-2002. The market price for peanuts was $0.19   
per pound. MPCI price guarantee for peanuts was $0.1775 per pound. As with MPCI, variation 
in coverage level is allowed.  Buy-up coverage guarantees up to 75% of APH yield for peanuts 
and 85% for cotton.  
Target-MOTAD, a mathematical programming procedure, was used to assess 
economically optimal crop insurance alternatives using varying target income and risk levels. 
Technical resources were included in the programming model, which consisted of 1000 acres of 
land, rotation constraints and allowed deviations from target income.  Allowed maximum 
deviation can be considered a proxy for risk.  Allowing larger deviation allows more risky 






 options.  A section of the model is presented in table 3. 
Because peanut yields were consistently low on both case-study farms for the 12 years of 
historic data, peanuts did not enter the initial optimal solution for either farm on the initial 
analysis.  To achieve a more representative situation for the area, where peanuts are typically 
produced in rotation with cotton, yields for peanuts were inflated by 37% to bring yields to a 
level consistent with those normally experienced by area producers planting peanuts in a 3 year 
rotation with cotton (Frank et al.).  The "high yield" scenario was used to determine which 
insurance products would enter the solution if peanut yields were sufficiently high to make 
peanuts an attractive production alternative. The model specified that peanuts must be rotated. 
However, no restriction was put on cotton. Continuous cotton was allowed. 
Results 
For the first farm, with the original (uninflated) yields, only cotton entered the solution, 
with no insurance option selected.  For the historical yields on this farm, crop insurance never 
provided a higher return than no insurance.  On the second farm, using a target income of 
$60,000, cotton entered the optimal solution with 70% CRC insurance coverage.  On both farms 
land resources were left idle as allowed variation from target income decreased.   
When peanut yields were increased by 37% on farm 1, a rotation scheme of 3 years of 
cotton to 1 year of peanuts resulted in 750 acres of cotton and 250 acres of peanuts and expected 
return $98,194 entered the solution.  Insurance did not enter the solution and thus was considered 
to be not risk-reducing for this farm. Cotton yields have been relatively high and with less 
variation than that experienced by farm 2. 
Results of the Target-MOTAD analysis for farm 2, with the increased peanut yields and a 






 coverage with 75% CRC insurance for cotton. To reduce overall risk, the 60% coverage MPCI 
insurance for peanuts should be replaced by 70% MPCI coverage.  As allowed variation from 
target income continues to be reduced net returns are lowered and land is idled.  Tables 5 and 6 
provide a summary of key results for the two target incomes with the higher peanut yields. When 
allowed deviation dropped below $52,409 for $90,000 target income and below $29,116 for 
$50,000 target incomes were not achieved. 
Discussion 
Crop insurance was not risk reducing for farm 1. Cotton yield were stable and did not 
drop below 1 bale per acre (Table 1). Farm 2 however required a 70% CRC insurance level to 
mitigate allowed risk.  Table 2 indicated a higher level of variation in yield for both cotton and 
peanuts on farm 2. When historical peanut yields were inflated to come in line with regional 
yields, for farm 1, both peanuts and cotton entered the optimal solution without insurance.  On 
farm 2, with higher peanut yields, as allowed deviation from target income fell, insurance 
coverage increased from 70% CRC to 75% CRC for cotton and from 60% MPCI to 70% MPCI 
for peanuts.  Hence crop insurance was risk reducing for the second farm, but not the first.   
The fact that crop insurance was not risk-reducing for one of the two cotton-peanut farms  
analyzed in this study has implications for the existing program.   It is clear from this analysis 
that crop insurance is not an optimal risk reducing tool for all farms.  Tying federal disaster 
assistance to participation in the existing crop insurance program may result in some risk-averse 
producers participating in crop insurance even though it would actually increase the risk they 
face in a typical year.  CAT coverage might be a useful alternative for these producers even 
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 Table 1 Original Yields for Farm 1 
Year            Cotton           Peanuts 
1 1292  2737 
2 911  3251 
3 706  3101 
4 669  2826 
5 629  2772 
6 911  3196 
7 1021  3423 
8 563  4064 
9 799  3294 
10 780  2911 
11 891  3678 
12 734  3536 
Yield in pounds per acre. 
 
Table 2 Original Yields for Farm 2 
Year            Cotton           Peanuts 
1 1183  3298 
2 971  3718 
3 646  2253 
4 1106  3600 
5 475  3500 
6 965  4595 
7 952  3233 
8 442  3352 
9 792  3452 
10 360  772 
11 1033  4291 
12 701  4052 










 Table 3. Selected Rows and Columns of TARGET-MOTAD Matrix for FARM 1 with increased yields 
C = cotton. P= peanuts. 
                          C
noins 








D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 RHS
Objective  65.29                          59.16 58.94 196.92  192.65
Land                            
                              
                            
               
              
              
                    
                      
              
              
              
                  
                 
                
            
1 1 1 1 1 <= 1000
Risk 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 <= Lamda 
Rotation -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 1 1 <= 0
1991  332.127  325.975  325.755 67.961 63.710 1 >= Target  
1992  112.073  105.935  105.715  201.755 197.503 1 >= Target 
1993  -17.659  -23.787  -24.007  162.710 158.451 1 >= Target 
1994  37.869 31.744 31.524 91.128 86.869 1 >= Target 
1995  27.453 21.330 21.110 77.072 72.783 1 >= Target 
1996  148.927  142.802  142.582  187.439 183.166 1 >= Target 
1997  232.399  226.274  226.054  246.527 242.241 1 >= Target 
1998  -76.536  -82.662  -82.882  413.379 409.088 1 >= Target 
1999  -0.093 -6.219 -6.439  212.948 208.654 1 >= Target 
2000  24.210 18.085 17.865  113.253 108.998 1 >= Target 
2001  -1.146 -7.267 -7.487  312.903 308.622 1 >= Target 






 Table 4. Selected Rows and Columns of TARGET-MOTAD Matrix for FARM 2 with increased yields 
C = cotton. P = peanuts. 
                          C
noins 








D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 RHS
Objective  52.28                            47.51 47.33 225.7 229.15
Land                            
                              
                            
                     
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                       
                               
                       
                    
1 1 1 1 1 <= 1000
Risk 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 <= Lamda 
Rotation -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 1 1 <= 0
1991 267.367  261.043  260.843  213.989 209.593 1 >= Target
1992 148.136  141.826  141.626  323.315 318.916 1 >= Target
1993 -53.167  -59.457  -59.657  -58.024  -62.426 1 >= Target
1994 347.067  340.774  340.574  292.600 288.199 1 >= Target
1995 -85.888  -92.165  -92.365  266.570 262.173 1 >= Target
1996 183.568  177.293  177.093  551.599 547.190 1 >= Target
1997 187.263  180.996  180.796  197.070 192.660 1 >= Target
1998 -153.68  -159.92  -160.12  228.046 223.639 1 >= Target
1999 -3.908 -10.148  -10.348  254.076 249.664 1 >= Target
2000 -223.31 -211.55 -211.57 -443.52 -353.68 1 >= Target
2001 68.075 61.831 61.631  472.467 468.055 1 >= Target






 Table 5. Allowed deviation and expected returns for a target income of $90,000 ($90/acre) 






CCRC70  CCRC75 P MPCI60 P MPCI70  Land used  Idle land 
  55000  100028  750.00  250.00   1000.00  0.00 
  54000  97789  750.00  250.00   1000.00  0.00 
  53000  97188  747.21  249.07  996.28  3.72 
  52409 90008    692.01    230.67  922.68 77.32 
  C = cotton. P= peanuts. 
Table 6. Allowed deviation and expected returns for a target income of $50,000 ($50/acre) 





CCRC70 C CRC75 P MPCI60 P MPCI65 P MPCI70  Land 
used 
Idle land 
36000 100028 750.00    250.00      1000.00  0.00 
35000  99930  750.00    250.00   1000.00  0.00 
34000 95467 717.51        239.17  956.68 43.32 
33000  86464 649.84        216.61 866.45 133.55 
32000  78788    605.74      201.91 807.65 192.35 
31000  71732    551.50      183.83 735.33 264.67 
30000  60742    467.01      155.67 622.68 377.32 
29116  50003    384.44      128.15 512.59 487.41 
  C = cotton. P= peanuts. 
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